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I. PUBLIC SECTOR DRUG TESTING: AN OVERVIEW.
A. THE NON-CONSENSUAL TAKING OF URINE BY THE GOV-
ERNMENT IS A SEARCH AND SEIZURE WITHIN THE
MEANING OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
1. The United States Supreme Court has held that the taking blood is
a search and seizure within the meaning of the fourth amend-
ment. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
2. The overwhelming majority of recent federal and state decisions
holds that the taking of urine is a search and seizure within the
meaning of the fourth amendment. McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F.
Supp. 1122, 1127 (S. D. Iowa 1985), on remand from 746 F.2d 785 (8th
Cir. 1984) (interlocutory appeal affirming district court's prelimi-
nary injunction), appeal docketed, No. 85-1919-Si (8th Cir. 1985);
Capua v. City of Plainfield, No. 86-2992, slip op. at 8 (D.N.J. Sept.
18, 1986); Bostic v. McClendon, No. C-85-2330A, slip op. at 6 (N.D.
Ga. July 10, 1986); Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500, 1508
(D.D.C. 1986); Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F. Supp. 1214, 1217-18
(S.D.N.Y. 1984); City of Palm Pay v. Bauman, 475 So. 2d 1322, 1325
(Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1985); Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482,
488-89 (N.D. Ga. 1985); Murray v. Haldeman, 16 M.J. 74, 81
(C.M.A. 1983); Caruso v. Ward, No. 6791 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 1,
1986).
(a) In McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1127 (S.D. Iowa
1985), the court, noting the difference between the taking of
blood from the body and the taking of urine, nevertheless de-
clared that the seizure of urine is also a search within the
meaning of the fourth amendment. The court further noted
that urine is discharged and disposed of under circumstances
where the person certainly has a reasonable and legitimate
expectation of privacy. Indeed, the court stated:
It is significant that both blood and urine can be ana-
lyzed in a medical laboratory to discover numerous
physiological facts about the person from whom it
came, including but hardly limited to recent inges-
tion of alcohol or drugs. One clearly has a reasonable
and legitimate expectation of privacy in such per-
sonal information contained in his body fluids.
Therefore, governmental taking of a urine specimen
is a seizure within the meaning of the fourth amend-
ment.
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(b) In an even more recent case, the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey, holding that the taking of urine
is a search and seizure within the meaning of the fourth
amendment, concluded that the public interest in eliminating
drugs in the workplace, although substantial, is not sufficient
to invade the privacy of innocent individuals in order to dis-
cover those who may be guilty. Citing to McDonell v. Hunter,
612 F. Supp. 1122, 1127 (S. D. Iowa 1985), the court, in Capua v.
City of Plainfield, No. 86-2992 (D.N.J. Sept. 18, 1986), con-
cluded that "[als with blood, each individual has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the personal 'information' bodily
fluids contain. For these reasons, governmental taking of a
urine specimen constitutes a search and seizure within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment." Capua, slip op. at 7-8
(citations omitted).
B. THE INDIVIDUALIZED REASONABLE SUSPICION STANDARD.
Most recent authority indicates that urinalysis of public employees
generally does not require a warrant, or particularized probable
cause, but rather, individualized, reasonable suspicion based on ob-
jective facts. See, e.g., McDonnell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1130
(S.D. Iowa 1985), on remand from 746 F.2d 785 (8th Cir. 1984) (inter-
locutory appeal affirming district court's preliminary injunction), ap-
peal docketed, No 85-1919-S1 (8th Cir. 1985); Capua v. City of Plainfield,
No. 86-2992 (D.N.J. Sept. 18, 1986); Bostic v. McClendon, No. C-85-
2330A (N.D. Ga. July 10, 1986); Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500,
1508-09 (D.D.C. 1986); Turner v. Fraternal Order of Police, 500 A.2d
1005, 1009 (D.C. 1985); City of Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475 So. 2d 1322,
1325-26 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Allen v. County of Passaic, No. L-
19262-86PW, slip op. at 18 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law. Div. June 23, 1986);
Caruso v. Ward, No. 6791, slip op. at 12-13 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 1, 1986);
Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264, 1267
(7th Cir. 1976); Odenheim v. Carlstadt-East Rutherford Regional School
District, 211 N.J. Super. 54, -, 510 A.2d 709, 713 (1985); Anable v.
Ford, No 84-6033, slip op. at 45 (S.D. Ark. July 12, 1985) (available on
WESTLAW); Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers v. Board of Educa-
tion of the Patchogue-Medford Union Free School District, No. 85-8759,
slip op. at5-6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Suffolk Co. June 14,1985), aft'd, 119 A.D.
2d 35,505 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1986); cf. Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp.
482, 491 (N.D. Ga. 1985); Fraternal Order of Police, Newark Lodge No. 12
v. City of Newark, No. L-095001-85E (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. June 16,
1986); King v. McMickens, 120 A.D.2d 351, 501 N.Y.S.2d 679 (1986).
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1. CORRECTIONAL EMPLOYEES
McDonnell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1130 (S.D. Iowa 1985), on
remand from 746 F.2d 785 (8th Cir. 1984) (interlocutory appeal af-
firming district court's preliminary injunction), appeal docketed,
No. 85-1919-Si (8th Cir. 1985). Department of Corrections em-
ployees brought action challenging, on fourth and fourteenth
amendment grounds, the constitutionality of Department policy
subjecting employees to searches of vehicles and persons. The
court determined that the state's weighty interest in preserving
security and order within the prison should be balanced against
the individual's significant invasion of privacy. In conclusion, the
court held that the fourth amendment allows the state to demand
urine, blood or breath specimens of employees only on the basis
of a reasonable suspicion which is to be based upon specific objec-
tive facts and reasonable inferences drawn from those facts that
the employee is then under the influence of alcoholic beverages or
controlled substances.
King v. McMickens, 120 A.2d 351, N.Y.S.2d 679 (1986). Two correc-
tions officers were dismissed for refusing to submit urine samples
for drug analysis subsequent to a report from the office of the
special prosecutor that a confidential informant had alleged that
plaintiffs were involved in illegal drug activities. The court con-
cluded that there was substantial evidence and a rational basis for
a determination that the plaintiffs were involved in illegal drug
activities, and thus there was a basis for reasonable suspicion that
plaintiffs were engaged in activities inappropriate to their office.
Therefore, there was no constitutional violation.
2. POLICE OFFICERS AND COURT CLERKS
Bostic v. McClendon, No. C-85-2330A (N.D. Ga. July 10, 1986).
Plaintiff Bostic, a court clerk, and plaintiff Thigpen, a police offi-
cer, were terminated after their urinalyses produced positive re-
sults indicating the presence of illegal drug substances. After ini-
tially deciding that the urinalyses constituted a search and seizure
within the meaning of the fourth amendment, the court utilized a
balancing test in which the individual's expectation of privacy
was balanced against the the government's right as an employer
to investigate employee misconduct, which is or may be directly
relevant to the employee's performance of his duties and the gov-
ernment's performance of its statutory responsibilities. The court
noted that the plaintiffs had a significant expectation of privacy
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which was clearly infringed upon by the governmental conduct at
issue. On the other hand, the court reasoned that the defendant
police department had a strong interest in protecting the public by
ensuring that its employees were fit to perform their jobs. How-
ever, the fact that the police department had a legitimate interest
in detecting drug use by its officers did not authorize it to use any
method to detect such use.
Considering the nature of the police department's legiti-
mate interests and the individual officers' reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy, the court holds the Fourth Amend-
ment allows the defendants to demand a urine sample
from an employee for chemical analysis only on the basis
of a reasonable suspicion, based on specific objective
facts and reasonable inferences from those facts in the
light of experience, that a urinalysis will produce evi-
dence of illegal drug use by that particular employee.
Bostic, slip op. at 10.
Turner v. Fraternal Order of Police, 500 A.2d 1005, 1009 (D.C. 1985).
Police department regulation providing any department official
may order any member of force to submit to urinalysis upon sus-
picion of drug abuse, and also mandating testing at discretion of
member of Board of Police and Fire Surgeons, was constitutional
on its face and was not violative of fourth amendment when term
"suspected" was construed as requiring reasonable, objective
basis for medical investigation through urinalysis related to police
officer's fitness for duty. There must be a reasonable, objective
basis to suspect the urinalysis would produce evidence of illegal
drug use.
City of Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475 So. 2d 1322,1325-26 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985). Urinalysis is constitutionally permissible under rea-
sonable suspicion standard. City has the right to adopt a policy
which prohibits police officers and fire fighters from using con-
trolled substances at any time while they are so employed,
whether such use was on or off the job. But city's present policy of
requiring all fire fighters and police officers to submit to urine test-
ing or be subject to discipline up to and including discharge is
violative of the fourth amendment. The court stated that the
fourth amendment requires only that there be a reasonable suspi-
cion that urinalysis would produce evidence of illegal drug use.
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Allen v. County of Passaic, No. L-19262-86PW, slip op. at 18 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law. Div. June 23, 1986). Sheriff issued directive re-
quiring all personnel employed in the sheriff's department to un-
dergo urinalysis to test for the use of controlled and dangerous
substances. Plaintiffs, employees of the department, brought ac-
tion challenging directive on fourth amendment grounds. The
court determined that the appropriate standard to be applied was
that of reasonable suspicion. The official conducting the test must
be able to point to specific objective facts, and the suspicion must
be directed to a specified person. If these burdens are met, testing
becomes constitutionally permissible.
Caruso v. Ward, No. 6791, slip op. at 12-13 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 1,
1986). Petitioners sought to permanently enjoin respondents
from requiring current and future members of the City of New
York Police Department's organized crime bureau to consent and
submit to future periodic random drug testing. The court deter-
mined that respondents had failed to demonstrate or to document
that drug use presents a discernible problem or danger sufficient
to warrant the constitutional intrusion occasioned by standard-
less, random drug testing of the approximately 1,200 members of
the OCB. The court concluded that a reasonable belief of suspi-
cion standard, coupled with greater vigilance, drug education
and other less intrusive methods, may accomplish the same pur-
pose with a lesser invasion of privacy.
3. FIRE FIGHTERS, FIRE OFFICERS, AND
COMMUNICATIONS OPERATORS
Capua v. City of Plainfield, No. 86-2992 (D.N.J. Sept. 18, 1986).
Plaintiffs, all fire fighters and fire officers employed by the City of
Plainfield, and a communications operator for the Plainfield Po-
lice Department, were ordered to submit to surprise urinalyses.
Prior to the testing, the plaintiffs had no notice of the city's intent
to conduct the mass urinalyses. Furthermore, the urinalyses had
not been provided for in the city's collective bargaining agree-
ment, nor was there any written directive, order, departmental
policy or regulation promulgated establishing the basis for such
testing and prescribing appropriate standards and procedures for
collecting, testing and utilizing the information derived. As a re-
sult of the urinalyses, sixteen fire fighters tested positive
for the presence of controlled dangerous substances. They were
then immediately terminated without pay. Those who tested
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positive were not informed of the particular substance found in
their urine or of its concentration. Neither were they provided
with copies of the actual laboratory results. Furthermore, written
complaints were served upon these individuals, charging them
with numerous violations, including "commission of a criminal
act." Capua, slip op. at 4. Defendants had no warrants, no proba-
ble cause, nor any particularized reason to believe that any of the
individuals tested used, possessed or were under the influence of
drugs. Utilizing a balancing test, the court reasoned that the ulti-
mate determination of the "search's" reasonableness required a
judicious balancing of the intrusiveness of the search against its
promotion of a legitimate governmental interest. The court noted
that the defendants' mass urine testing program subjected plain-
tiffs to a relatively high degree of bodily intrusion. Furthermore,
the requirement of surveillance during urine collection forced
those tested to expose parts of their anatomy to the testing official
in a manner akin to a strip search exposure. The court reasoned
that the manner of taking the test, regardless of how profession-
ally or courteously conducted, was likely to be a very embarrass-
ing and humiliating experience. The court further noted that com-
pulsory urinalysis forced the individuals tested to divulge
private, personal medical information unrelated to the govern-
ment's professed interest in discovering illegal drug abuse. Since
the Supreme Court and the Third Circuit had recently recognized
a right of privacy in such medical information, see Whalen v. Roe,
429 U.S. 589, 602 (1977), and United States v. Westinghouse Electric
Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir. 1980), the District Court of New
Jersey determined that the medical disclosure resulting as a by-
product of urinalysis created cause for grave confidentiality con-
cerns. The court thus concluded:
The sweeping manner in which defendants set
about to accomplish their goals violated the fire fighter's
individual liberties. As to each individual tested the
search was unreasonable because defendants lacked any
specific suspicion as to that fire fighter....
The invidious effect of such mass, round-up urinal-
ysis is that it casually sweeps up the innocent with the
guilty and willingly sacrifices each individual's Fourth
Amendment rights in the name of some larger public in-
terest.... Although plaintiffs' privacy and liberty inter-
ests may be diminished on the job, these interests are not
extinguished and therefore must be accorded some con-
stitutional protection.
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Capua, slip op. at 16-17. Further noting that the fourth amend-
ment speaks in terms of individual guarantees, the court rea-
soned that "[e]very individual has the absolute right to be free
from searches and seizures absent the establishment of some de-
gree of reasonable suspicion against him or her." Id. at 17. There-
fore, the mass surprise urinalyses conducted by the city of Plain-
field was unreasonable and unconstitutional.
4. SCHOOL BUS ATTENDANTS
Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500, 1508-09 (D.D.C. 1986). Plain-
tiff, a school bus attendant for school system, was terminated on
the basis of a single, unconfirmed EMIT test after being subjected
to directive of school system's drug use surveillance program,
which required mandatory urinalysis. Defendants had no war-
rant, no probable cause, nor any particularized reason to believe
plaintiff used, possessed or was under the influence of drugs. The
court held that a school bus attendant should not reasonably ex-
pect to be exposed to such testing. Indeed, the court stated that
public safety considerations do not require testing of a school bus
attendant similar to that imposed by the military, nor do they re-
quire more stringent testing than so far found permissible for the
police or for bus drivers in the absence of particularized probable
cause. Thus, the termination was unconstitutional in the absence
of individualized reasonable suspicion.
5. BUS DRIVERS
Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264,
1267 (7th Cir. 1976). Bus drivers' union brought action against
transit authority, challenging constitutionality of rules requiring
bus drivers to submit to blood or urine tests following their in-
volvement in a serious accident, or when they were suspected of
being intoxicated or under the influence of narcotics. The court
recognized that the state has a paramount interest in protecting
the public by ensuring that bus drivers are fit to perform their
jobs. The bus drivers had no reasonable expectation of privacy
with regard to submitting to blood and urine tests under the cir-
cumstances enumerated above. The tests were given only in hos-
pitals and only upon the concurrence of two supervisory em-
ployees. Thus, the conditions under which the intrusions were
made were reasonable.
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6. PUBLIC SCHOOL STUDENTS
Odenheim v. Carlstadt-East Rutherford Regional School District, 211
N.J. Super. 54, -, 510 A.2d 709, 713 (1985). Board of Education
policy required urinalyses of students as part of an annual physi-
cal. The court, finding the random policy unconstitutional as
violative of the students' expectation of privacy, applied the bal-
ancing test articulated by the United States Supreme Court in New
Jersey v. T.L.O., _ U.S. -, 105 S. Ct. 733, (1985). The court
concluded that defendants' actions were not justified at their in-
ception, nor was the "search" reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.
Anable v. Ford, No. 84-6033, slip op. at 45 (S.D. Ark. July 12, 1985)
(available on WESTLAW). Urinalyses were utilized by school offi-
cials to determine whether students had used marijuana at
school. The court determined that before such a search could ever
be justified, there would have to be a "high probability" that the
search would disclose evidence of a violation of school rules or the
criminal laws. The court stated that other less intrusive means
were available and would be consistent with constitutional re-
quirements, since they were reasonably related to the mainte-
nance of order and security in the school.
7. PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS AND OFFICIALS
Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers v. Board of Education of the
Patchogue-Medford Union Free School District, No. 85-8759, slip op.
at 5-6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Suffolk Co. June 14, 1985), aff'd, 119 A.D.2d
35, 505 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1986). Mandate of school district that all
teachers being considered for grant of tenure must submit to a
urine test to determine the presence of illegal drugs constituted an
impermissible and unconstitutional search under the fourth
amendment. The court concluded that an invasive bodily search
could constitutionally be made only when based upon reasonable
suspicion supported by objective facts.
C. EXCEPTIONS TO REQUIREMENTS OF
INDIVIDUALIZED REASONABLE SUSPICION.
1. ROUTINE PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS
McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1127 (S.D. Iowa 1985), on
remand from 746 F.2d 785 (8th Cir. 1984) (interlocutory appeal af-
firming district court's preliminary injunction), appeal docketed,
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No. 85-1919-Si (8th Cir. 1985). Although holding that correctional
employees could not be subjected to urinalyses in the absence of
individualized reasonable suspicion that such testing would
produce evidence of illegal drug use, the court recognized three
possible exceptions to the reasonable suspicion standard: (1) as
part of a routine pre-employment examination; (2) as part of a
routine periodic physical administered to all employees; or (3) on
a periodic basis as a condition of employment "under a discipli-
nary disposition."
2. REGULATED INDUSTRIES
Shoemakerv. Handel, 619F. Supp. 1089 (D.N.J. 1985), aff'd, 795F.2d
1136 (3d Cir. 1986). Five well known jockeys brought an action
challenging the constitutionality of regulations adopted by the
commission that permitted the state racing steward to direct any
official, jockey, trainer or groom to submit to breathalyzer or urine
testing to detect alcohol or drug consumption. The regulations
provided for sanctions of varying severity, including lifetime sus-
pension from racing for persons testing positive. The court noted
that the statutory powers of the New Jersey racing commission
included "full power to prescribe rules, regulations and condi-
tions under which all horse races shall be conducted." N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 5:5-30 (West 1973). The court further noted that because
the public wagers on the outcome of races, the commission's reg-
ulations were focused upon the necessity for preserving both the
fact and the appearance of integrity of the racing performances.
The jockeys urged that the mandatory daily breathalyzer test and
the random urine test could not be required without individual-
ized suspicion. The commission, which did not argue that the
mandatory test did not involve a search or seizure within the
meaning of the fourth amendment, instead urged that such war-
rantless searches or seizures by voluntary participants in the
highly regulated racing industry were reasonable. The court
opined that in general, a warrant is required for a search to be
considered reasonable under the fourth amendment. However,
"[i]n closely regulated industries, ... an exception to the warrant
requirement has been carved out for searches of premises pursu-
ant to an administrative inspection scheme." Shoemaker, 795 F.2d
at 1142. The court stated that there are two interrelated require-
ments justifying the warrantless administrative search exception.
The first is that there must be a strong state interest in conducting
an unannounced search; the second is the pervasive regulation of
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the industry must have reduced the justifiable privacy expecta-
tion of the subject of the search. Id. The court concluded that be-
cause both these requirements were present in the warrantless
testing of persons involved in the New Jersey horse racing indus-
try, the testing was reasonable, and therefore there was no consti-
tutional violation. In conclusion, the breathalyzer and urine tests
of the jockeys at the race track proximate to race time absent any
individualized suspicion, and, as administered under regula-
tions, were deemed reasonable in light of the regulated nature of
horse racing and the government's interest in maintaining the in-
tegrity of the industry and safety of the sport.
3. SAFETY SENSITIVE POSITIONS
Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500 (D.D.C. 1986). School bus
drivers or mechanics directly responsible for the operation and
maintenance of school buses might reasonably expect to be sub-
ject to urine and blood tests not required of other employees with-
out particularized suspicion.
Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264 (7th
Cir. 1976). Fourth amendment prohibits only unreasonable
searches. In determining whether or not a search is reasonable,
court weighs governmental interests against expectation of pri-
vacy. Where government interest is particularly high, and policy
requiring mandatory, non-individualized suspicion test is an-
nounced, balance tips in favor of permitting test.
Sanders v. WMATA, No. 84-3072 (D.D.C. Jan. 9, 1986). Post-
accident and post-sick leave testing of transit workers is constitu-
tionally permissible.
Fraternal Order of Police, Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, No.
L-095001-85E (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. June 16, 1986). Police
might reasonably expect to be subject to urine and blood tests
because of safety-sensitive position.
4. NON-CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS OR PROCEDURES
Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ga. 1985). Plaintiffs
worked in the electrical distribution division of the Board of Lights
and Water and worked around high voltage electric wires. Defen-
dant city manager, and the manager of the Board of Lights and
Water, began receiving reports from various sources of drug us-
age by employees of the Board. The city manager formed the be-
lief that such drug usage may have been responsible for what ap-
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peared to be a large number of injuries to Board employees. Based
upon investigatory information, the city manager decided that he
had sufficient evidence to terminate certain employees for use of
drugs on the job. When none of the employees volunteered to
resign, the city manager advised them that they would be fired
unless they chose to submit to urinalyses. The plaintiffs elected to
undergo urinalyses, and each of them tested positive for the pres-
ence of marijuana. All of the plaintiffs were fired as a result of the
urinalyses. Although the court held that urinalysis is a search and
seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment, it adopted
an exception to the warrant requirement which involves searches
of government employees. Essentially, the court held that while
government employees did not surrender their fourth amend-
ment rights merely because they go to work for the government,
the government nevertheless has the same right as any employer
to oversee its employees and investigate potential misconduct rel-
evant to the employee's performance of his duties. Because the
government, as employer, has the same rights to discover and
prevent employee misconduct relevant to the employee's per-
formance of his or her duties, the employee cannot claim a legiti-
mate expectation of privacy from searches related to the em-
ployee's performance of his or her duties. Because the urinalysis
in this case was conducted in a purely employment context and
was not done in connection with any criminal investigation or
procedure, the urinalyses administered were not unreasonable
searches in violation of the fourth amendment.
5. MILITARY
Committee for GI Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
Class action was brought on behalf of enlisted members of the
Army's European Command, in which it was claimed that var-
ious features of the drug abuse prevention plan adopted by the
Command were unconstitutional. When a soldier has been iden-
tified as a possible drug user, on the basis of an inspection or oth-
erwise, he is subject to mandatory drug processing. Balancing a
number of factors, including the fact that the military forces are
charged with the responsibility of continuously protecting the na-
tion's interests both on the domestic and international levels, the
court determined that the GI's interest in his own personal pri-
vacy and security was outweighed by the government's interest.
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Thus, the warrantless drug inspections under the plan adopted
by the Command were reasonable and constitutionally perrnissi-
ble under the fourth amendment.
Murray v. Haldenan, 16 M.J. 74 (C.M.A. 1983). Applying factors
enunciated in Callaway, the court concluded that even though the
compulsory urinalysis to which Murray was subjected consti-
tuted a "seizure" of his urine within the meaning of the fourth
amendment, the seizure was reasonable. The court stated that
urine specimens were not included within the protection accord-
ed to service members, i.e., furnishing a urine specimen - even
pursuant to a military order or direction - is not an "intrusion
into" a body cavity within the meaning of MIL. R. EVID. 312 (c), or
an "intrusive search of the body" within the meaning of MIL. R.
EvID. 312(e).
II. EMPLOYEE CONSENT AND/OR WAIVER TO URINALYSIS.
A. Courts will not normally find valid consent where the consent is re-
quired as a condition of employment.
B. Public employees cannot be bound by unreasonable conditions of
employment. See, e.g., McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D.
Iowa 1985); cf. Hester v. City of Milledgeville, 777 F.2d 1492 (11th Cir.
1985).
III. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS.
A. Recent San Francisco Ordinance Bars Most Employee Drug Testing, 23
Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 1748 (Dec. 9, 1985).
B. State search and seizure guarantees may be interpreted more broadly
than fourth amendment.
IV. OBJECTIONS TO USE OF TEST RESULTS.
A. CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS.
1. DISCIPLINE AND/OR DISCHARGE
Discipline or discharge based on unconstitutional urinalysis, i.e.,
not based on individualized reasonable suspicion or probable
cause, is generally invalidated. See, e.g., Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F.
Supp. 1500 (D.D.C. 1986). Arguments based on inapplicability of
exclusionary rule were not raised in Jones, nor do they appear to
have been raised elsewhere; as a federal constitutional matter, see
I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
1987-881
JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH
2. DUE PROCESS OBJECTIONS
Even where policy is valid, there may be due process objections to
the imposition of discipline or other adverse action based on relia-
bility of test results, e.g., inherent test limitations, unconfirmed
tests, chain of custody problems.
(a) INHERENT UNRELIABILITY
Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500 (D.D.C. 1986), cites exten-
sive authority for unreliability of standard (EMIT) test absent
confirmation by alternative methods. Instructions of com-
pany producing EMIT test say it is insufficient for adverse ac-
tion absent such confirmation. Experts have agreed that un-
confirmed EMIT tests are too unreliable for adverse action.
See e.g., Morgan, Problems of Mass Urine Screening for Misused
Drugs, 16 J. PSYCHIATRIC DRUGS 305 (1984). False positives
(drug reading where no drugs present) occur at unacceptably
high rates; they may be caused by lawful over-the-counter
drugs, such as Contact or Sudafed, poppy seed cake or bagels,
melanin in skin, passive inhalation, or herbal teas. See, e.g.,
Greenblatt, The Admissibility of Positive EMIT Results as Scien-
tific Evidence, 6 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 114-16
(1985); ALCOHOL AND DRUGS IN THE WORKPLACE: COSTS, CON-
TROLS AND CONTROVERSIES 29 (BNA Special Report 1986).
(b) UNRELIABLE LABORATORY HANDLING
The Centers for Disease Control has found lab accuracy
ranges from 37% to 69%. Hansen, Caudill, & Boone, Crisis in
Drug Testing: Results of a CDC Blind Study, 253 J. A.M.A. 2382
(1985); ALCOHOL AND DRUGS IN THE WORKPLACE: COSTS, CON-
TROLS AND CONTROVERSIES 30 (BNA Special Report 1986). As
of 1984, the Army was reported to have mishandled 52,000
urine samples. One Army Lab had an error rate of 97%. ARMY
TIMES, Apr. 2, 1982, at 1. See also Banks v. FAA, 587 F.2d 92 (5th
Cir. 1982) (overturning discipline of an air traffic controller
where the samples were destroyed and not available for verifi-
cation); Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F. Supp. 1214, 1221-22, 1225
(1984).
(c) UNCONFIRMED TESTS
Where agency policy requires confirmed tests, discipline
based on an unconfirmed test is arbitrary and capricious, in
violation of due process. Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500
(D.D.C. 1986).
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V. TORT - DEFAMATION.
Houston Belt & Terminal Railway Co. v. Wherry, 548 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1976) (switchman awarded $150,000.00 compensatory damages
and $50,000.00 punitive damages where employer relied on uncon-
firmed erroneous drug report and then defamed plaintiff with results).
VI. FEDERAL EMPLOYEES -
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.
National Federation of Federal Employees v. Weinberger, 640 F. Supp. 642
(D.D.C. 1986). Federal employees who are subject to the Civil Service
Reform Act, and have available to them remedial procedures provided
for therein, must pursue their constitutional and statutory challenges to
agency action before an appropriate administrative tribunal before they
are entitled to judicial review. Thus, an action wherein a union of critical
federal employees sought to enjoin the government from implementing
a drug abuse testing program for federal employees in the Department
of the Army, was more appropriately characterized as involving a labor/
management dispute, which was an issue of federal personnel policy
under the Civil Service Reform Act, and as such, was not an action as to
which jurisdiction was vested in federal court to rule on the merits of
whether urinalysis of the federal employees required a warrant, particu-
larized probable cause, or individualized reasonable suspicion. In con-
clusion, the court held that plaintiffs' claims belonged before either the
Federal Labor Relations Authority or the Merit System Protection Board,
since the action involved a labor/management dispute and was gov-
erned by the exclusive jurisdictional framework of the Civil Service Re-
form Act.
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